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8. Appendix 
8.1 Defining the Degree of Unification in Financial Supervision and the Central Bank 
Involvement  
The creation of the FAC Index is based on an analysis of which and how many 
authorities in 48 countries are empowered to supervise the three traditional sectors of 
financial activity: banking, securities markets, insurance. To transform the qualitative 
information into quantitative indicators, we assigned a numerical value to each type of 
authority, in order to highlight the number of the agencies involved. The rationale with 
which we assigned the values considers simply the concept of unification of supervisory 
powers: the greater the unification, the higher the index value. The index is built on the 
following scale: 7 = Single authority for all three sectors (total number of supervisors=1); 5 = 
Single authority for the banking sector and securities markets (total number of 
supervisors=2); 3 = Single authority for the insurance sector and the securities markets, or 
for the insurance sector and the banking sector (total number of supervisors=2) 1 = 
Independent specialized authority for each sector (total number of supervisors=3).  
We assign a value of 3 to the single supervisor for the banking sector and securities 
markets because of the predominant importance of banking intermediation and securities 
markets over insurance in every national financial industry. It also interesting to note that, in 
the group of integrated supervisory agencies countries, it seems to be a higher degree of 
integration between banking and securities supervision than between banking and insurance 
supervision; therefore, the degree of concentration of powers is, ceteris paribus, greater. 
These observations do not, however, weigh another qualitative characteristic: there 
are countries in which one sector is supervised by more than one authority. It is likely that 
the degree of concentration rises when two authorities exist in a given sector, and one of 
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which has other powers in a second sector. On the other hand, the degree of concentration 
falls when there are two authorities in a given sector, neither of which has other powers in a 
second sector. It would therefore seem advisable to include these aspects in evaluating the 
various national supervisory structures by modifying the index as follows: adding 1 if in the 
country there is at least one sector with two authorities, and one of these authorities is also 
responsible for at least one other sector; subtracting 1 if in the country there is at least one 
sector with two authorities assigned to supervision, but none of these authorities has 
responsibility for another sector; 0 elsewhere.  
Furthermore, we should consider the nature of the institutions involved in supervisory 
responsibilities. We propose the index of the central bank's involvement in financial 
supervision: the Central Bank as Financial Authority Index (CBFA). For each country, and 
given the three traditional financial sectors (banking, securities and insurance) the CBFA 
index is equal to: 1 = the central bank has not the main responsibility in banking supervision; 
2 = the central bank has the responsibility in banking supervision; 3 = the central bank has 
responsibility in two sectors; 4 = the central bank has responsibility in all three sectors. 
 
8.2 Defining the Degree Monetary Commitment and Central Bank Independence 
To define the monetary commitment and the central bank independence, one should be 
as comprehensive as possible. In the following, we describe 9 criteria (consisting of 12 
components) proposed in Freytag (2001) that theoretically determine the institutional 
position of the central bank. The first 6 criteria (8 components, indicated with a asterisk in 
Table 1A) are used to build up the index of independence, while the overall set of 
components are utilized for the monetary commitment index. 
1) Stated objectives of monetary policy. A clear definition of the objective of monetary 
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policy in the legal foundation of monetary regime, namely price stability, makes it easier for 
the central bank to refuse demands to combat unemployment or to finance public spendings 
via money growth. Thus, commitment varies with the kind and number of legally prescribed 
objectives (component obj).. 
2) Locus of legal commitment. The commitment to stability has to be put into a legal 
framework. This legal framework can be fixed on different constitutional levels. The more 
difficult a change of the regime is for the government, the higher is the commitment 
(component const). 
3) Discretionary power belonging to the government. The more the government keeps 
control over instruments such as exchange rates, interest rates, open market policy and so 
on, the less it commits to stability (component gov). 
4) Conditions of appointment and dismissal of monetary policymakers. First, the 
question is who is able to become chief executive officer (CEO), especially whether only a 
reputed expert or any other person can be appointed (component ceo). Second, how is a 
potential dismissal organised (component diss)?  
5) Conditions of lending to the government. An important factor determining the level of 
legal commitments is a provision on lending fresh money to the government (component 
limcred). Even central bank holding of government bonds purchased on the secondary market 
(component limsec) has fiscal effects as long as the seigniorage is added to public revenues. 
Thus, the level of commitment is the lower, the easier it is for the government to borrow 
money from the monetary institution. 
6) Accountability of the central bank. The level of commitment is higher, the better the 
public is informed about monetary policy (component acc). 
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7) Public pledges of the government. External obligations raise the level of commitment 
(component extern) compared with a situation without these obligations.  
8) Convertibility restrictions. The level of commitment is positively correlated with the 
degree of convertibility (component conv). We distinguish full convertibility of all 
transactions, restricted convertibility for either capital or current account transactions or no 
convertibility at all. A second component (mult) shows whether or not the market for foreign 
exchange is unified. If it is, commitment in this respect is high. 
9) Interactions with other currencies. Monetary competition exerts competitive pressure 
on the domestic monetary authorities to issue a sound currency. The permission of monetary 
competition raises the level of commitment to stability (component comp). 
 
8.3 Sources 
For all the countries we use the official documents and web sites of the central banks 
and the other financial authorities. The information is updated until 2004. See also 
Cukiermann 1992, Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti 2002, Freytag 2001. 
